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o matter how hard we work to make our democracies 
tolerant and inclusive, there will always be citizens who 
reject the basic idea that we should give everyone an 
equal say in the first place. They want to tear down the whole 
system and replace it with something designed to exclude those 
groups that they deem to be unworthy of the standing of free and 
equal citizenship, and they just won’t stay quiet about it. They 
write blogs, make speeches, organise marches, and, sooner or 
later, some of them graduate to violence. So far, so depressingly 
familiar. But what should we do about these radical dissenters? In 
particular, how are we to reconcile the liberal principle of free 
speech with our duty to protect the rights and freedoms of all 
citizens? Corey Brettschneider’s main aim in his original and 
insightful book is to find a way to stand firm on the principle of 
free speech, as he believes that this “right gives citizens an 
entitlement to say and believe whatever they wish”,1 without 
conceding that a liberal state is impotent to resist the spread of 
hateful doctrines that deny the freedom and equality of all 
citizens. The solution Brettschneider proposes is to distinguish 
between the coercive and expressive roles of the state. He argues 
that although the state must permit the expression of 
discriminatory and objectionable beliefs, it has a responsibility to 
!
1 C. Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should it Say? How Democracies 
Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), 37. Unless otherwise stated, parenthetical references are to this 
text. 
N
Philosophy and Public Issues – Illiberal Views in Liberal States 
 126!
articulate its foundational principles, rebut hateful viewpoints, 
and, ultimately, to persuade citizens to adopt its values as their 
own. The problem that I wish to raise in this paper is that he is 
insufficiently sensitive to the dangers of non-rational persuasion. 
Brettschneider argues that liberal democratic states are not 
value neutral in the sense that they have no values of their own 
and serve only to impartially defend a maximal set of liberties for 
all of their citizens. Instead, he advocates ‘value democracy,’ the 
view that the state “should engage in democratic persuasion, 
actively defending the democratic values of freedom and equality 
for all citizens” (4). He points to Martin Luther King Day and 
Black History Month as examples of how the state can emphasise 
its commitment to the principle of equal civil rights and thereby 
speak up for associated values such as tolerance, dignity, and 
equality (46). He is careful to set limits on how democratic 
persuasion can be pursued, and the ends it should be used to 
achieve. He sets a substance-based limit which proscribes state 
action to combat inegalitarian beliefs that do not themselves 
challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship. However, I will 
be primarily interested in his means-based limit, which “requires 
that the state not pursue the transformation of citizens’ views 
through any method that violates fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of expression, conscience, and association” (87). In 
particular, Brettschneider asserts that this “does not mean that it 
must avoid emotion or rhetorical persuasiveness” (89). I think 
this leads him into trouble. Although he rejects “subconscious or 
subliminal methods” (89), he does not rule out non-rational 
persuasion, which is a powerful tool that Aristotle warned could 
be open to abuse. Even if we set aside that issue, we still have two 
important grounds for concern about the use of non-rational 
persuasion. The first is autonomy, and the second is stability.  
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One way of thinking about the relationship between autonomy 
and authority is that submission to the authority of a state can 
enhance citizens’ autonomy by helping them to respond to 
reasons as part of a collective. We can best respond to our 
reasons for averting climate change say, or for guaranteeing civil 
rights to everyone, as a political community. However, many of 
our reasons do not mandate collective action and this is true of 
our reasons for adopting moral principles and values and, indeed, 
making them a part of how we think about ourselves and our 
communities. When the state deploys non-rational persuasion it 
might well be successful in inculcating its core values in its 
citizens, but those citizens do not take up those values as a 
response to reasons. The state is not helping them to be 
autonomous in a sphere where I shall argue it is particularly 
important to be autonomous—the construction of one’s moral 
identity. 
I will argue that a necessary condition for being autonomously 
committed to a value or a principle is that one endorses it because 
of the considerations that count in its favour. It is only when 
commitments are endorsed for reasons that they constitute an 
expression of our nature as reason-responsive beings. Emotional 
appeals, rhetorical devices, and other non-rational means of 
persuasion look to be at odds with this conception of autonomy. 
My claim is that it matters to us that we select our values for 
reasons so there is, at the very least, a significant missed 
opportunity here if the state takes it upon itself to persuade us to 
embrace its values in a non-rational way.  
More seriously, though, on a Razian model of authority it is 
not clear that the state has the authority to do this because it is 
moving beyond helping us to comply with our reasons by telling 
us what to do, and trying to help us to comply with our reasons 
by influencing what we care about, how we think, and even how 
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we understand ourselves.2 This is an important departure because 
establishing the first does not necessarily establish the second. 
The expressive state needs its own answer to the question of how 
to reconcile authority and autonomy. 
The next problem I will tackle is concerned with stability. 
Brettschneider suggests that value democracy will promote the 
stability of a liberal democracy by persuading citizens to adopt its 
core values (107). My argument will be that values that are 
autonomously adopted or endorsed have deeper roots and are for 
that reason more robust than values held non-rationally. In the 
absence of sufficiently good reasons to reverse an earlier decision 
to endorse a value, acting contrary to it calls into question one’s 
identity as a reason-responsive agent. I shall argue that this is 
something that most of us care deeply about and so it generates a 
weighty sanction to tie us those values that we do autonomously 
adopt. Values that we do not endorse for reasons are much more 
fragile. When the effect of the rhetorician’s repetition (or 
alliteration), for instance, wears off then it is hard to see what 
binds the citizen to the value if it is challenged. 
Ultimately, I submit that Brettschneider needs to go beyond 
his substance and means-based constraints and think about what 
it means for citizens to adopt values and anchor them within their 
own identities. My suggestion will be that he introduce a third 
constraint on the use of non-rational persuasion to the effect that 
it should only be used to make citizens aware of considerations to 
which they might otherwise have been blind. In this way, value 
democracy will facilitate, rather than bypass, autonomy and the 
process of tangibly committing to values as a response to reasons. 
I shall begin by explaining the basis and significance of 
democratic persuasion and then move on in Section II to look in 
!
2 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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more detail at the limits that Brettschneider does, and doesn’t 
place, on the expressive state. Section III will consider the nature 
of rhetoric and begin to lay out the potential pitfalls and 
drawbacks of extra-rational persuasion. I will explore this line of 
thought in the sections on autonomy, authority, and stability, 
before proposing my autonomy-based limit in Section VII. 
 
I 
Democratic Persuasion 
Hateful viewpoints, Brettschneider tells us, express “an idea or 
an ideology that opposes free and equal citizenship” (1). Those 
who are committed to them typically “seek to bring about laws 
and policies that would deny the free and equal citizenship of 
racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, women, or groups defined 
by their sexual orientation” (1). Now, broadly speaking, there are 
two familiar approaches to dealing with people who are 
committed to such positions. We can insist that the state remain 
neutral and protect their right to express their noxious views up 
to the point where it amounts to threatening harm or inciting 
violence in a combustible situation. Mill’s example of stirring up 
an already agitated mob is still a good example here.3 
Alternatively, we can legislate to outlaw hate speech and bring the 
might of the modern state to bear on those who express views 
that are incompatible with the core values that underpin liberal 
democracy. 
The problem with option number one is that it lets extreme 
discriminatory speech go unchallenged. At best this seems to us 
!
3 See J. S. Mill, On Liberty in M. Warnock (Ed.) Utilitarianism; On Liberty; Essays 
on Bentham: Together with selected writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, 
(Glasgow: Collins Fount, 1962), 184.  
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weak, but at worst it is dangerous - hateful ideologies have gained 
traction before. What kind of state would stand idly by while its 
core values are eroded? Targeted groups might also suspect a 
measure of complicity if their state quietly goes about the 
business of facilitating hurtful and poisonous speech. Hateful 
viewpoints cast a long historical shadow and it is not 
unreasonable for minority groups to be suspicious under such 
circumstances. 
Option two is also unsatisfactory. It is, after all, a restriction 
on freedom, but more importantly it constrains debate when it is 
the debate about its own foundational values that characterises 
democracy. It was Mill again who argued that it is only by 
considering and confronting objections that we prevent our 
principles from lapsing into dead dogma. On that basis we can 
conclude that prohibition has the perverse effect of 
impoverishing both the actual and prospective proponents of 
democracy insofar as it robs them of the opportunity to develop 
their capacities for a sense of justice in the context of a full and 
frank exchange of views.4  
Like any good showman, Brettschneider proceeds to offer us a 
third option. We can distinguish between the state’s capacity to 
coerce its citizens5 and its ability to influence behaviour by 
!
4 Rawls’s conception of the moral person is based on what he calls the two 
moral powers. The first is the capacity for a sense of justice, which is the ability 
to judge things to be just and unjust and the willingness to propose and abide 
by fair terms of cooperation. The second moral power is the ability to form 
and revise a conception of the good. See J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 18-19. 
5 See D. Knowles Political Obligation: A Critical Introduction, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), 19. This is what Knowles calls the “nasty face of the state” 
because states “threaten their citizens, fine, imprison, publicly shame and exact 
compulsory service from them. In some jurisdictions they inflict corporal 
punishment and the death penalty”.  
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communicating with them instead. The latter is its “expressive 
power” (3) and it exercises this when it ‘speaks’ to us. This opens 
up a possible course of action for the state between the extremes 
of prohibition, and the heavy-handed tactics that must 
accompany it, and standing by idly twiddling its metaphorical 
thumbs. The state can permit, and indeed protect, the rights of 
dissenting citizens to give voice to their hateful viewpoints while 
at the same time rebutting those viewpoints and articulating, and 
thereby affirming, its commitment to the free and equal status of 
all of its citizens. 
What Brettschneider has in mind, then, is a state that actively 
defends and promotes democratic values. This is where 
democratic persuasion comes in, the aim of which “is to change 
the minds of the opponents of liberal democracy, and, more 
broadly, to persuade the public of the merits of democratic 
values” (6). Indeed, the right we have been considering of all 
citizens, including the hateful ones, to advance their views is 
grounded in these very values.6 Aside from the attractive middle 
ground that it opens up between prohibition and value neutrality, 
Brettschneider offers four reasons for the state to be in the 
business of promoting values.7  
First, he claims that a state is less legitimate when there is a 
low level of congruence between the state’s foundational values 
of free and equal citizenship and the popular beliefs held by the 
citizenry. This is not to say that a state cannot be morally justified 
without this congruence, but Brettschneider believes that there is 
something regrettable about such a situation (38). He is 
unfortunately vague on the exact nature of the democratic value 
!
6 Brettschneider refers to this as the paradox of rights (5-6). 
7 For Brettschneider, individuals have a duty first to adopt democratic values 
and then to promote them in dialogue with their fellow citizens (37; 41; 50; & 
93). 
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of high levels of congruence, and, indeed, on precisely how we 
should understand legitimacy. However, as I shall show later, in 
Section IV, there are autonomy-based reasons for encouraging 
congruence since these are the appropriate values for citizens to 
adopt. 
Diminishing levels of congruence also raise the spectre of an 
unstable state that lacks sufficient public support to make its laws 
stick. Stability requires general compliance, and the Rawlsian 
condition of stability for the right reasons is only satisfied when 
that compliance is firmly rooted in citizens’ shared sense of 
justice. Brettschneider is surely right that there comes a point 
when a notional democracy cannot meaningfully be called a 
democracy at all if its members eschew the basic tenets.  
Third, the status of free and equal citizenship can be hollowed 
out if contrary views and practices are widespread in a 
community. Whether in the home, the workplace, or out and 
about in the world, everyday instances of discrimination can make 
a mockery of the state’s formal declarations. This is especially 
problematic if it is public officials who develop anti-democratic 
sentiments since they are the ones charged with delivering on the 
state’s guarantees. Only when democratic values are widespread is 
it reasonable to trust that public officials will reliably enforce and 
protect free and equal citizenship.  
Finally, as we have already discussed, the state has an 
obligation to not only preserve the free and equal citizenship of 
its members, but to do so publicly and in a way that dispels any 
reasonable suspicion of complicity with the expression of hateful 
viewpoints.  
Democratic persuasion can take a number of forms. Perhaps 
the most familiar example is written judicial rulings where judges 
outline the basis of their decisions and trace a line back to 
Carl Fox – The Limits of Democratic Persuasion 
 133!
political values enshrined in the constitution. However, 
Brettschneider suggests that states are, in fact, much more 
proactive in fulfilling their expressive function. Another key 
example he offers is public apologies. For instance, in 2013 the 
Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny issued a formal apology on behalf of 
the state for its role in supporting the now infamous Magdalene 
Laundries. Tens of thousands of women were effectively 
imprisoned and used as a source of free labour. Many were forced 
to give up their newborn babies. One of the reasons for issuing 
that apology was to distance the state from values that were 
incompatible with treating all of its citizens as free and equal, and 
to unambiguously declare that commitment for the future.8 
States can also ‘speak’ simply by drawing attention to notable 
historical figures and honouring them for their embodiment of 
particular values and causes. Declaring public holidays can, 
therefore, be a form of state speech. So too with erecting statues, 
organising public events, and issuing special stamps, notes, and 
coins. And we should not forget education, since the state can 
place democratic values right at the heart of students’ curricula.  
So, the state can speak in a multitude of different ways and it 
can make its voice all but impossible to ignore. A key difference, 
then, between state speech and the speech of individuals is that 
!
8 “For we saw difference as something to be feared and hidden rather than 
embraced and celebrated. But were these our ‘values’? Because we can ask 
ourselves for a State – least of all a republic: What is the ‘value’ of the tacit and 
unchallenged decree that saw society humiliate and degrade these girls and 
women? … in naming and addressing the wrong, as is happening here today, 
we are trying to make sure we quarantine such abject behaviour in our past and 
eradicate it from Ireland’s present and Ireland’s future. In a society guided by 
the principles of compassion and social justice there never would have been 
any need for institutions such as the Magdalene Laundries”. 
http://www.thejournal.ie/full-text-enda-kenny-magdalene-apology-801132-
Feb2013/ Accessed 1/6/15. 
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the state can speak so much louder.9 Democratic persuasion 
must, therefore have limits and it is to these that we shall now 
turn. 
 
II  
Limits on the Expressive State 
Brettschneider is aware of the danger that, as sometimes 
happens in its coercive role, the expressive state could become 
overbearing and intrusive. In order to buttress the rights to free 
speech and freedom of conscience he imposes two limits on state 
speech.  
The first limit that I will discuss, although it is the second limit 
that Brettschneider enumerates, is the ‘substance-based limit’, 
which prohibits the state from confronting inegalitarian beliefs 
that do not challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship. One 
example he uses is religious belief in the damnation of non-
believers and members of other creeds (35). This is an 
inegalitarian belief, but it is not incompatible with a commitment 
to free and equal citizenship in one’s political community. Neither 
is the inequality involved in being a bad friend and failing 
consistently to pay your way when out for lunch, since this does 
not imply hostility to free and equal citizenship (89).  
 The substance-based limit prevents an overzealous state from 
imposing a comprehensive doctrine, rather than promoting the 
political values for which it properly has responsibility. It would 
!
9 Brettschneider recognises the worry that the state’s “massive power,” means 
that its expression could be “in a sense overwhelming,” although he ultimately 
concludes that so long as the state’s voice does not drown out other voices this 
objection does not gain any traction (152). As we shall see, it is a little more 
complicated.  
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fail to respect its citizens as moral equals if it inserted itself into 
deliberations that are not strictly publically relevant.10 So, 
“persuasive attempts at transformation should only be aimed at 
those beliefs that are openly hostile to or implausibly consistent 
with the ideal of public equality” (14). The state should, therefore, 
refrain from promoting a ‘thick’ conception of the good and 
ensure that its speech is consistent with all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that overlap on the principle of respect 
for persons as free and equal. 
Brettschneider’s other limit is the ‘means-based limit’ which 
concerns the methods that states can employ to get their message 
across. It requires “that the state not pursue the transformation of 
citizens’ views through any method that violates fundamental 
rights, such as freedom of expression, conscience, and 
association” (87). He claims that on his view “the state can avoid 
crossing the means-based limit by confining its method of 
communicating its message to its expressive rather than its 
coercive capacity” (87), and he defines coercion as “the state 
threatening to impose a sanction or punishment on an individual 
or a group of individuals with the aim of prohibiting a particular 
action, expression, or holding of a belief” (88). 
Citizens are to be respected as free and equal and this, he tells 
us, also “bars the kind of propaganda that avoids reasons, and 
relies on character assassination, mockery, or the denial of an 
individual’s humanity” (89). Expanding on the idea that 
democratic persuasion must retain some kind of connection to 
reasons, Brettschneider goes on to say that the state should not 
!
10 Of course, while there is no necessary connection between some 
inegalitarian beliefs and hostility to free and equal citizenship, we may worry 
that it is psychologically easy to make that transition. Even so, the state must 
keep a proper distance and restrict its persuasive efforts for the sake of 
permitting citizens to develop and exercise their two moral powers. 
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“resort to subconscious or subliminal methods that shun reason 
altogether” (89). However, it is not difficult for persuasion to 
meet the condition that it not shun reason ‘altogether’, and this is 
where a problem starts to emerge. 
Emotional appeals and rhetorical devices are permitted for the 
expressive state (89). Indeed, Brettschneider takes the position 
that it would be remiss of the state to refrain from such effective 
methods since it is now in the business of persuasion: “[g]iven the 
choice between expressing the values of freedom and equality in a 
non-persuasive or persuasive manner, all else being equal, the 
state should opt for forms of persuasion that are more 
convincing” (91). This is deep water, and I submit that 
Brettschneider charts the wrong course by effectively farming out 
his theory of rhetoric to Simone Chambers and Bryan Garsten 
(91 fn.35).  
I say this for three reasons. First, it papers over a failure to 
adequately spell out the potential problems here for democratic 
persuasion. Second, Brettschneider is too quick to help himself to 
other theories without demonstrating that they are fully 
compatible with his own. Chambers, in particular, is primarily 
interested in mass deliberation and collective decision-making. 
This is, of course, relevant here, but Brettschneider is at least as 
interested in citizens’ individual interests in cultivating their two 
moral powers. As such, Chambers’ account of deliberative 
rhetoric, while helpful, cannot simply be plugged in. Having said 
this, Chambers’ distinction between ‘plebiscitary rhetoric’11 and 
‘deliberative rhetoric’ is instructive and points the way towards a 
third limit that I shall argue should be imposed on democratic 
!
11 See S. Chambers “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative 
Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?” in Political Theory, 2009, 37 (3), 
337-339. 
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persuasion.12 The former encompasses speakers, broadly 
understood, who are focused only on ‘winning’ some issue or 
campaign.13 Deliberative rhetoric, in comparison, “makes people 
think, it makes people see things in new ways, it conveys 
information and knowledge, and it makes people more 
reflective”.14  
Third, skipping over the dangers of rhetoric detracts from one 
of the chief virtues of Brettschneider’s articulation of value 
democracy. On the whole, When the State Speaks offers something 
that is still sadly rare in political philosophy: concrete guidance for 
the political sphere. Our governments do have to deal with the 
problems caused by unreasonable citizens spouting hateful 
viewpoints. Understanding and embracing the expressive role of 
the state instead of occasionally grasping at it would constitute 
genuine progress. Deploying non-rational means of persuasion is 
not without its dangers and drawbacks. An exhortation to go 
away and learn about rhetoric, instead of a frank discussion 
followed by an appropriate action-guiding principle, is not in 
keeping with the spirit of practical philosophy that motivates the 
rest of the book. 
In truth, the charge that he is advocating non-rational 
persuasion is unfair to Brettschneider. Extra-rational persuasion is 
better since he is not suggesting that state methods shun reason 
altogether, but rather that they can, and should, go beyond 
presenting the relevant reasons themselves in a clear and 
accessible way. The aim appears to be persuasion, as opposed to 
!
12 See Section VII. 
13 See Chambers again: “[o]n this view, rhetoric, while able to cleverly defend 
itself, is not interested in engaging in debate or dialogue, which is to say, 
rhetoric is not interested in giving an account of itself. Rhetoric is interested in 
winning the day” Ibid, 327. 
14 Ibid, 335. 
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the facilitation of deliberation, and, if this is indeed what he 
means, then we are again led to the conclusion that his view does 
not map perfectly on to Chambers’ view.  
In the absence of clarity I think we need to work through the 
potential pitfalls and drawbacks of rhetoric and extra-rational 
persuasion. We will then be in a position to suggest a limit that 
unambiguously prohibits emotional appeals and other tricks and 
devices except when they are used to alert citizens to relevant 
considerations that might otherwise evade their deliberations. 
And so it is to the dangers of rhetoric that we shall now turn. 
 
III 
The Dangers of Rhetoric 
For Aristotle, rhetoric was the skill of persuasion. A 
rhetorician possesses the ability to get individuals and groups to 
feel, believe, and, ultimately, to do things. Jamie Dow argues that, 
as Aristotle understands it, rhetoric aims at an epistemic good.15 
He claims that “an orator presents listeners with proper grounds 
for conviction of his conclusion just if what he presents to them 
is—by their lights—good reason for adopting the conclusion he 
is recommending.”16 We must distinguish, however, between the 
skill itself, and the ends for which it can be used.  
!
15 J. Dow Passions & Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 34. 
16 Ibid 51. There are three grounds that the speaker can provide: his character 
(ethos), standard premises (logos), and the emotions of his audience (pathos). 
Emotions are often picked on here as improper grounds for belief. Dow 
advances the view that Aristotle thought of emotions as complex states that 
included cognitive content, which is to say, roughly speaking, that a person in a 
state of fear takes her circumstances to be such that fear is warranted. If this is 
correct, then it is possible that an orator who can elicit fear of some person or 
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As with any skill, the ability to persuade can be abused for the 
sake of bad or misguided ends. Since we are talking about 
extending, or at least recognising a new kind of, state power, it is 
an important concern that it may be misused. We do not have to 
look very hard to find examples of persuasive politicians who 
proved to be completely unfit to hold this kind of power.  
However, I want to leave this worry aside here for a similar 
reason to Aristotle’s.17 That a thing can be bent and twisted to 
nefarious purposes is not, by itself, a decisive reason to deny 
ourselves the benefits it offers. In the case of democratic 
persuasion, those benefits could be considerable. As Dow 
suggests: “From the point of view of the state, we value skilled 
speech-making because of its epistemic contribution to public 
deliberation in politics and law. From the point of view of the 
listener, when anyone sincerely pays attention to a speech, it is 
not in the hope of being duped or manipulated but in the hope of 
being informed and helped to a better-deliberated view”.18 
It is clear enough that the ultimate end of democratic 
persuasion is a good one. The goal is not simply to win the 
argument with hateful viewpoints, but to win over their adherents 
to the cause of free and equal citizenship, deepen the 
commitment of reasonable citizens, and create an atmosphere in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
set of circumstances can thereby provide a listener with a premise for some 
argument. I will not examine this position here.  
17 “If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech 
may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies to equally to all good things 
except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as 
strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the 
greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm”. 
Aristotle The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric, trans. by J. H. Freese, (London: Heinemann, 
1926), 1355b2-7. See also J. Dow, Passions & Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 51 fn.31.  
18 Ibid 83. 
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which everyone can deliberate and express themselves as a moral 
equal. Any politician who deployed her rhetorical skills for some 
other ultimate end would not be engaging in democratic 
persuasion.  
The pursuit of noble ends, however, sometimes obscures 
inappropriate use of means. Individuals have an interest not only 
in greater levels of reflection and deliberation in general, but also 
in working through each step in the argument for democratic 
values for themselves. With this in mind we might be concerned 
when Brettschneider tells us that democratic persuasion “allows 
for certain forms of rhetoric to further the democratic values that 
underlie rights, provided that the rhetoric is truthful and 
combined with the promulgation of reasons” (91 fn.35). 
Specifically, we might worry that although the ultimate aim is one 
we can endorse, it is consistent with using psychological 
techniques and speechcraft to sweep citizens along when it comes 
to individual points and considerations. In fact, before we get to 
that point we must consider George Tsai’s contention that there 
are some circumstances in which even the giving of reasons can 
count as objectionably paternalistic.19 If it impinges on those areas 
of their lives over which they are ordinarily entitled to control 
then it can be problematic.  
Offering reasons is often assumed to be the paradigm case of 
respect for agency, but Tsai worries about cases where an agent 
offers reasons to another but denies her a sufficient opportunity 
to engage with those reasons for herself.20 In such cases, he 
!
19 G. Tsai, “Rational Persuasion as Paternalism,” in Philosophy & Public Affairs 
2014, 42 (1), 78-112.  
20 Ibid, 88. In fact, there are three necessary conditions for rational persuasion 
to count as paternalistic. Tsai worries about cases where an agent offers 
reasons to another, but is motivated to intervene by distrust and concern, 
conveys via this intervention the message that the other party is insufficiently 
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thinks, the giving of reasons can constitute a lack of respect. The 
pressure that rational persuasion might bring to bear can be such 
that an individual might justifiably feel that her agency has been 
usurped and that any subsequent decision or action is not really 
her own. 
As Tsai notes: “[t]hinking for yourself involves having some 
control over your reasoning process. It involves having some 
independence—some space, some time—to exercise your 
reasoning capacities meaningfully, on your own terms”.21 If I have 
an important decision to make but you continue to bombard me 
with advice, even if it is good advice, I might struggle to work 
through it on my own. Agents of the state speak from a position 
of presumptive authority, have access to expertise beyond the 
reach of ordinary citizens, and can broadcast their message in a 
wide range of prominent formats. This problem is compounded 
by Brettschneider’s rejection of what he calls the ‘spatial 
metaphor of privacy’ and its replacement with the idea of 
‘publicly justifiable privacy’. The upshot is that “private beliefs, 
communications, and actions are not immune to public 
evaluation” (29). He does consider the right to resist 
transformation (165-167), but in the context of discussing Bob 
Jones University’s discriminatory practices he makes it clear that 
this does not extend to the right to be left alone “in the sense of 
never being criticized” (166). Brettschneider is wary of coercion 
because it would “impair the ability of citizens to determine 
autonomously which beliefs they wish to hold and defend” (88). 
Once we open up the definition of state speech to include such 
things as statues and public h0lidays, it becomes clear that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
capable of weighing reasons for herself, and when this action denies her an 
opportunity to engage with those reasons for herself. Considerations of space 
prevent me from engaging with the substance of Tsai’s argument here. 
21 Ibid, 92. 
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state can ensure that its messages are pervasive and all but 
impossible to ignore. In that sense we might be concerned that 
democratic persuasion can prevent us from exercising appropriate 
control over our own deliberations. 
Why is it so important for individuals to work through these 
matters for themselves? In the next three sections I will attempt 
to explain this by discussing autonomy, authority, and stability. It 
will emerge that extra-rational persuasion presents a distinct 
threat here, which is why we must be so cautious in setting the 
boundaries for the expressive state. 
 
IV 
Autonomy 
In this section I will sketch an account of the autonomous life 
in terms of responding to reasons. When our deliberations are 
unduly influenced, either deliberately or unwittingly, we are 
denied an opportunity to express our rational natures by 
responding to reasons on our own. One of the most important 
ways in which we can respond to reasons is to fashion our own 
selves by constructing identities. Ultimately, democratic 
persuasion aims at identity formation (and transformation) since 
this is how democratic values can be anchored in citizens’ own 
ways of thinking and being. My argument will be that democratic 
persuasion that encroaches upon citizens’ own process of 
responding to reasons potentially robs them of the opportunity to 
be autonomous in a sphere where it is particularly significant. 
Extra-rational persuasion for the purpose of driving us towards a 
particular belief, commitment, or action straightforwardly satisfies 
this definition because it generates responses in a non-rational 
way.  
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Here is the idea: it matters to us that we live intelligible lives and 
the way to live an intelligible life is to act for reasons, indeed to 
act for good reasons. A very particular type of freedom consists 
in liberation from our limitations as embodied beings, determined 
by our natural drives and desires. Autonomy is often understood 
in opposition to heteronomy.22 We are not autonomous, we 
might think, when we are driven by desires and appetites as 
opposed to what our reason tells us. The issue here is not so 
much that we have needs and wants as embodied creatures with a 
complex evolutionary past. It is true enough that I can exercise 
only limited control over my need to eat, for example. But this 
only undermines my ability to understand myself as a rational 
agent when my biological imperatives loom too large over my 
deliberations and obscure other, weightier, considerations for 
action. Excepting extreme circumstances of deprivation or stress, 
we can, as Christine Korsgaard emphasises, always “back up” 
from our drives and desires and reflect on the question of what 
we should do.23 What would we make of a creature who possessed 
this capacity but was never moved to weigh considerations 
against one another in order to decide how best to act? Very little, 
I think, and if we do not want to be like that then we have an 
interest in being responsive to reasons.  
We are also beings who persist over time and this affords us 
the opportunity to decide who we want to be and what we want 
to do with our lives. We can, I submit, form and revise our 
conceptions of our own selves, partly anyway, as a response to 
reasons. Our moral principles are particularly important elements 
!
22 For a classic statement of the contrast see I. Kant, The Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals trans. by M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 4:446-447.  
23 C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity in O. O’Neill (Ed.) The Sources 
of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambdrige University Press, 1996), 93. 
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in our self-conceptions because of the deep regulative role that 
they play. Allow me to illustrate this with a trivial example. 
Consider the principle that when in the pub one should make 
some extra space for any valiant soul trying to carry more than 
two pints.24 Now, sometimes we describe our commitments in 
terms of a personal set of rules that we observe but this makes a 
natural, elegant solution into something cumbersome. It is not so 
much that I have a rule about making some space for people 
trying to get away from the bar with more than two handfuls. 
Rather, I simply understand myself as the kind of person who 
makes a little more room for someone with a precarious load.  
Incorporating moral principles into our identities in this way 
secures their place in our deliberations because it attaches a 
weighty sanction that is incurred in the event of a violation. To 
act contrary to a principle that forms part of how you think about 
and understand your self is to undermine your identity and 
compromise who you are. This is something that matters a great 
deal too almost all of us and it also explains the significance that 
Brettschneider attaches to what he calls ‘reflective revision’.25 
Now, how does all of this bear on non-rational persuasion? 
Brettschneider suggests that it is good for all citizens to hear a 
reasoned defence of public values (45). We can now tell a story 
about this in terms of autonomy as responsiveness to reasons. 
Individuals ought to acknowledge these values and they do better 
as reason-responsive agents when they do. For those individuals 
who already buy into the ideal of free and equal citizenship, 
!
24 Please drink responsibly. 
25 “Citizens engage in reflective revision when they endorse the idea of free 
and equal citizenship and appeal to it to evaluate more general beliefs… To the 
extent that public values might conflict with the existing worldview held by 
citizens, a political conception of free and equal citizenship requires reforming 
and changing existing beliefs” (52). 
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another hearing may clarify certain aspects or consequences of 
their commitment and so improve their ability to respond 
appropriately to those considerations that apply to them in their 
publicly-relevant deliberations and behaviour. However, insofar 
as the state engages in extra-rational persuasion, it robs its citizens 
of the opportunity to respond on their own to the considerations 
that count in favour of free and equal citizenship. This also 
explains the enhanced moral status of states that permit their 
citizens to express their political views, no matter how noxious 
they might be. And the ideal scenario is one in which citizens 
reason their way to free and equal citizenship for themselves and 
incorporate it into their worldviews. This is why congruence 
should be so highly prized.26 
Effective non-rational persuasion will have an effect on our 
feelings, beliefs, and behaviour and, we may suppose, will result 
in respective changes that are fitting for citizens who have an 
obligation to uphold public values. The problem is that these 
changes will not be responses to reasons. Further, it presents a 
missed opportunity to facilitate the deliberate process of identity-
creation.27 This will turn out to impact negatively on stability, but 
for now the concern is simply that it is particularly important to 
us to respond to reasons by forging our identities and it is not an 
insignificant loss when this opportunity is taken away. This is not 
to say that it may never be better, all things considered, for the 
state to take a hand here, but it raises a clutch of questions about 
authority that cannot be ignored. 
 
!
26 See Section II. 
27 This is not to say that identity-formation must always be a conscious 
process. The thought is that there is, however, something special about 
working on yourself in this way, and this includes reflecting on your 
commitments and endorsing only those that withstand critical scrutiny. 
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V 
Authority 
Brettschneider is not primarily interested in questions of 
authority and so never articulates an account of citizens’ duty of 
obedience to a suitably just state. In this section I will discuss 
Raz’s normal justification thesis to illustrate my worry that 
Brettschneider’s casual endorsement of extra-rational persuasion 
obscures a potentially serious lacuna in his theory. The worry is 
that if states take it upon themselves to help us to better comply 
with our reasons by controlling how we think and feel, then they 
have exceeded the scope of Razian authority and so we are led to 
wonder on what basis they could justify such power and how it 
could be reconciled with our interest in living autonomously. 
For Raz, “the normal way to establish that a person has 
authority over another person involves showing that the alleged 
subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him 
(other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and 
tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons 
which apply to him directly”.28 We should do what genuine 
authorities tell us to do because we will do better by all of our 
reasons, including our reasons for deciding what to do on our 
own, if we obey their orders. 
It is important to understand two other key features of the 
Razian story. The first is the dependence thesis and the second is 
the exclusionary structure that he imposes on our relationship 
with the various reasons that might bear on any particular 
decision that we have to make. The gist of Raz’s dependence 
thesis is that authorities do not spin out entirely new reasons 
!
28 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 53. 
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when they issue commands.29 Rather, what they do is create 
intermediary reasons that stand between us and the entire array of 
reasons relevant to the circumstances that call for action of some 
kind on our part. An individual is subject to someone else’s 
authority just when acting on foot of the latter’s directives will 
generally lead to them doing better by all of their reasons, and 
that is what provides the underlying justification for an authority 
relationship. 
The second feature we need to appreciate is the exclusionary 
character of authoritative directives on the Razian scheme. 
Commands from genuine authorities mute the force of the 
original reasons that they sum up and replace, even though their 
own force is still ultimately derived from the balance of those 
original reasons. What this means is that the original reasons 
should no longer be taken as reasons for action, you ought to act 
only on foot of the command.  
So, political authorities tell us what to do.30 Indeed, this is their 
defining feature. In issuing orders, they demand us to surrender 
to their judgment of what to do. However, this does not entail 
that we surrender our judgment generally if that is to be 
understood as not deliberating for ourselves or coming to our 
own conclusions about the best course of action. What matters is 
that we do as we are told. As Raz points out, “[s]urely what 
counts, from the point of the view of the person in authority is 
not what the subject thinks, but how he acts.”31  
Another way to approach this point is to think about the value 
of preserving the mental space for individuals to have a good 
think and play around with the original reasons in the solitude of 
!
29 Ibid, 47. 
30 Or what not to do, which for our purposes here amounts to the same thing. 
31 Ibid, 39. 
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their own minds. For one thing, practice makes perfect, and they 
may develop as reasoners by revisiting state directives and 
working through them from various angles. For another, it seems 
like a sensible idea to maintain a healthy scepticism towards one’s 
political authorities. States sometimes make grave errors and it is 
important both to be alive to them, so that one can recognise 
them when they occur, and to be disposed to challenge them if 
needs be.32  
Finally, although citizens should do as they are told, it should 
still be up to them to decide which values they endorse and what 
kinds of people they want to be. There are some instances in 
which submission to authority is the best way to respond to 
reasons. Think of collective action problems like climate change. 
Rather than trying to solve climate change solely as individuals, 
we should submit (or perhaps institute and then submit) to a 
suitable authority. However, this does not apply to something like 
my own identity; that is something for me to develop on my own.  
Democratic persuasion by non-rational means encroaches on 
this previously private space since political authorities would now 
be claiming the right to influence us through more than our 
critical faculties and exercise control over our thoughts and 
feelings. This would take Brettschneider beyond the scope of 
political authority as it is normally conceived. It is worth nothing 
that Raz does suggest that reflection on the merits of actions 
required by authorities could possibly “be prohibited by a special 
directive to that effect.”33 Perhaps there are some extreme 
circumstances in which our reasons support such total obedience 
that we should not even risk thinking for ourselves, but clearly 
!
32 Of course, we don’t want to be too suspicious or we could lose the benefits 
of authority altogether. See Ibid, 61-62, for a discussion of kinds of mistakes 
that undermine state authority. 
33 Ibid, 39. 
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Brettschneider cannot think that this applies to our commitment 
to democratic values. 
A natural objection here might be that this confuses the kind 
of authority that the expressive state needs. This objection relies 
upon the distinction that is sometimes made between practical 
and theoretical authority. Perhaps the state only claims to be a 
practical authority in its coercive role but in its expressive capacity 
it is better thought of as a theoretical authority. When it attempts 
to persuade its citizens it is just giving expert advice that we 
would do well to take, even though we don’t have to. This 
interpretation would fit nicely with Brettschneider’s concern to 
preserve the right to hold and express hateful viewpoints. But this 
response founders on emotional appeals and rhetorical devices.  
If you are an expert on financial matters and I want to know 
how best to invest my money, I should listen to you, but if I don’t 
you won’t use the emotional associations I make with my national 
flag or anthem, say, or the psychological effect of the power of 
three to bring me around. You won’t erect imposing statues of 
the poor hedge fund managers who had to make do without my 
money. Nor will you declare public holidays in honour of the 
investment opportunities that I have passed up. Democratic 
persuasion does not amount to coercion, but it goes far beyond 
the offering of advice. This point is especially pertinent in the 
case of extra-rational persuasion since this can have an effect 
without being subjected to critical scrutiny. 
To maintain the theory of value democracy and the expressive 
state as it is, Brettschneider would need to provide an account of 
political authority that vindicates the state in intruding into our 
deliberations in such a comprehensive way. A more 
straightforward solution will be offered in Section VII. Before I 
get to my proposal, however, I wish to raise a further ground of 
concern about extra-rational democratic persuasion. 
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VI 
Stability 
Brettschneider is concerned about the stability of a liberal 
democratic system and sees this as one point on which militant 
democrats might hope to gain some ground.34 In response, he 
contends that value democracy can secure stability by persuading 
citizens to adopt democratic values as their own. However, I 
think he proceeds too quickly. It is not uncommon for people to 
be persuaded of something only for the effect to wear off as the 
experience becomes less vivid in their minds. Most of us will have 
had the experience of changing our minds about something as the 
result of a persuasive talk or presentation only to find ourselves 
later unable to reproduce the arguments that seemed so 
convincing at the time. We may then slide back to our original 
position, particularly if pressed to take and defend a position by a 
new interlocutor. 
Advertising works precisely by foisting irrational connections 
upon us and by eliciting emotions that we then associate with a 
particular product. If I turn on the television and sit through an 
ad break, no doubt I’ll turn it off having acquired the idea that a 
soft drink will make me popular, a new car will make me sexually 
appealing, and big faceless corporations are as cuddly as cartoon 
animals. If challenged on any of these points the motivational 
potency of these ideas will (I hope) evaporate quickly. The more 
plausible the ideas, of course, the easier it will be to come up with 
ad hoc arguments or to latch on to existing ones. And, it must be 
said, democratic persuasion, as Brettschneider envisages it, will 
primarily be an exercise in rational persuasion. But, to the extent 
that it relies on extra-rational means, it will produce unstable 
!
34 See Brettschneider (17; 25; 38-39; 107). 
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results since the corresponding commitments will not be suitably 
anchored. 
Writing about the dangers of relying on received opinion, Mill 
said: “Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there 
remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or if any part, the 
shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence 
being lost.”35 As Brettschneider acknowledges, it is the whole 
justification that is owed to the public, and it is not sufficient that 
it is, like the truth, simply ‘out there.’ 
What Brettschneider really wants is for citizens to incorporate 
a commitment to free and equal citizenship into their own 
identities. This is why he speaks of a “duty for citizens to adopt 
democratic values as their own” (7) and argues that “the state 
should promote these values even when it requires seeking to 
persuade individuals to abandon or transform certain beliefs that 
are at odds with the ideal of free and equal citizenship” (13). The 
ultimate goal is not really to transform individual beliefs, but to 
inspire a transformation of the individuals themselves from 
people who understand themselves as, let’s say, white 
supremacists to people who identify as partners in a common 
political enterprise underpinned by democratic values. “When 
they engage in reflective revision, citizens internalise the reasons 
and values that underlie rights, and they transform their beliefs to 
make them consistent with free and equal citizenship” (29). When 
this occurs each individual citizen is bound respect her fellow 
citizens as moral equals by the cost of fracturing her own self-
conception.  
!
35 J. S. Mill, On Liberty in M. Warnock (Ed.) Utilitarianism; On Liberty; Essays on 
Bentham: Together with selected writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, (Glasgow: 
Collins Fount, 1962), 166. 
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But why does extra-rational persuasion pose a threat here? 
Identity-formation often takes place at an unconscious level and 
it is, of course, true that large parts of our identities are imprinted 
on us from a young age. One might object that I am offering, an 
overly voluntaristic understanding of identity-formation and 
ignoring the possibility that extra-rational persuasion for the right 
reasons can supplement and guide this process. 
For Rawls, the stability of a theory, and so conceivably of a 
state or a system, is largely about resisting temptations to act in 
ways that are contrary to its basic principles.36 Insofar as elements 
of our identities come to be perceived by us either as alien or 
unsupported by reasons then we are very likely to repudiate them. 
This is not to claim that we can remake our identities at will, but 
generally we strive quite hard to regulate our behaviour only by 
those principles that we have adopted or reflectively endorsed on 
account of the considerations that count in their favour. When 
elements of our identities that are not supported in this way are 
challenged, they quickly become a problem for us and as such 
cannot be contribute reliably to the stability of the democratic 
state by effectively regulating our conduct.   
Democratic persuasion can promote stability and efficacy only 
if it leads citizens to feel bound to support and comply with the 
institutions of a just state founded on the ideal of free and equal 
!
36 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 6. It is worth noting that Rawls saw a deep connection 
between stability, identity, and autonomy: “The most stable conception of 
justice, therefore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, 
congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but affirmation of the 
self” Ibid, 436. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005): “as a liberal political conception, 
justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first place unless it generates its own 
support in a suitable way by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained 
within its own reason” 186. 
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citizenship. I have argued that this is best achieved by facilitating 
citizens in incorporating the values of free and equal citizenship 
into their identities as a response to reasons. In this way it can 
also establish obedience to the state as an autonomous response 
to reasons for individual citizens and secure for them the 
democratic state’s meaning-giving role in creating and 
maintaining rational institutions and norms. 
One possible way to proceed here is for the state to find ways 
to make citizens’ own commitments transparent to them. If 
citizens can be assisted in drawing the connections between the 
principles with which they personally identify and the justification 
of the state then they will quite naturally feel bound to adhere to 
its rules when it acts justly. 
Another key avenue for democratic persuasion is through 
education, particularly of children and young people. Here the 
state will have to start by encouraging children to form identities 
that include a regulative commitment to the principles 
underpinning the justification of the state. Given the nature and 
development of children this will necessarily involve a degree of 
compulsion. However, the goal should not be to produce 
obedient but unquestioning citizens. Rather, it should be to foster 
the development of a critical spirit so that individuals can come to 
voluntarily endorse the values of the state. Only then can the 
values of the state form a stable part of their attempts to live 
autonomous lives as a successful response to reasons.  
As a child’s education progresses the curriculum should 
change too and teachers should strive to engage their pupils as 
rational agents, as indeed many of them already do. There is also 
no good reason why civic education should suddenly stop at a 
particular age. If we are to take seriously the liberal exhortation 
that the justification of the state should be available to all then we 
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must be prepared to invest heavily in facilitating access to 
education for all citizens.37 
In the end, it is for individuals themselves to make their 
democracies stable by identifying with those principles for which 
satisfactory justifications can be advanced and by policing their 
own commitments. In the next section I will offer a limitation on 
extra-rational means of persuasion that respects citizens as 
reason-responsive beings but permits emotional appeals and 
rhetorical devices when they are used to help citizens decide their 
political values by revealing to them relevant considerations that 
they might otherwise have missed. 
 
VII 
An Autonomy-Based Limit 
Persuasion is hard, and encouraging citizens to undertake 
reflective revision not only of their beliefs, but also of their 
identities, is extremely challenging. As Mill noted, “[w]e often 
hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping 
up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth 
which they nominally recognise, so that it may penetrate the 
feelings, and acquire mastery over the conduct” (167). It would 
be foolish to deprive ourselves of useful tools that can be used to 
enhance our sensitivity to the reasons that apply to us. In this 
section I will offer a third limit on democratic persuasion that 
permits appeals to emotion and other non-rational methods of 
!
37 Adults should not be forced to attend political philosophy courses, but the 
credentials of a state can certainly be enhanced by making civic education 
available to any and all who can be interested. For more in-depth treatment of 
civic education see A. Gutmann, Democratic Education (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999) and E. Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and 
Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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persuasion on the condition that they are used to increase 
sensitivity to considerations which are relevant to citizens’ 
deliberations about their political values. With this small addition 
I believe that Brettschneider’s important contribution to political 
theory can be fully embraced. Here is the limit I suggest: 
Extra-rational means of persuasion should only be employed in 
order to make citizens sensitive to considerations that apply to their 
publically relevant deliberations. 
I shall call this the autonomy-based limit for the reason that it 
facilitates citizens in responding to reasons and prohibits 
bypassing their critical faculties.  
Take as an example the production of a documentary video 
about the Magdalene Laundries I mentioned earlier. Let’s imagine 
that this video is intended to form part of a state-sponsored 
museum exhibition open to the general public. One directorial 
decision that will need to be made is whether music will be used 
at key points. Music can elicit the whole range of emotions and 
we have been well-trained by cinema and television to make 
associations and suppositions depending on the various cues 
emanating from our surround sound systems. My proposal allows 
us to distinguish between the use of music to indicate the priority 
of certain poignant contributions or perhaps draw our attention 
to the special horror of particular events, and the use of music 
simply to make us feel what the director wants us to feel.  
In the first instance, the aim is to assist the viewer in 
identifying those parts of the film that offer something of special 
significance for our appraisal of the historical actors and events, 
or that should bear on our deliberations about our political 
values. You might think that this is what charities do on a regular 
basis with their emotionally-charged television ads. Those of us 
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lucky enough to live in relatively safe, secure, and prosperous 
environments are informed about almost unimaginable hardship 
and loss on a daily basis. One response, which we almost all have, 
is to become inured to some degree. Charities need to break 
through this protective barrier if they are to have any immediate 
impact on our deliberations. This is, I think, acceptable just so 
long as the intention is to encourage us to acknowledge and 
reflect on upon particular considerations. It goes wrong when the 
purpose is to drive us towards a particular conclusion. This is 
when extra-rational persuasion risks robbing individuals of the 
opportunity to respond on their own by coming to their own 
conclusions and proceeding accordingly. 
This is, of course, a fine line since my limit applies to the 
intentions with which someone may deploy extra-rational means. 
As such, the very same means might be permissible in one case 
but not another depending on the intention of the persuader. It is 
reasonable to hope that political authorities possessed of the 
appropriate intentions will also be likely to use extra-rational 
means in a more responsible way, but what really matters here is 
that they approach their expressive role in the right way. As 
Brettschneider rightly argues, democratic persuasion by the 
expressive state can perform a vital role in a healthy political 
community and contribute to the establishment of a democracy 
worthy of the name. The principal thought underlying the 
autonomy-based limit is that, ultimately, state intervention to 
improve our deliberations must only come from a place of 
respect for citizens as rational agents with a higher-order interest 
in developing and exercising their two moral powers. 
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VIII 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have sought to show that there is a potential 
problem with Brettschneider’s important contribution. 
Specifically, he is too casual in endorsing extra-rational means of 
democratic persuasion. I argued that, as it stands, his theory can 
be interpreted in a way that permits the expressive state to deny 
important opportunities to its citizens to respond to reasons for 
themselves, calls into question the authority of the state, and fails 
to secure stability. I then proposed a third limit to slot in 
alongside the existing substance and means-based limits. This 
limit is the autonomy-based limit and it says that extra-rational 
means of persuasion should only be employed in order to make 
citizens sensitive to considerations that apply to their publically 
relevant deliberations. Adopting this limit would preserve the 
spirit of democratic persuasion and round out its appeal as a 
novel and action-guiding piece of practical philosophy. 
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